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Very recently, Professor Nic Wiehahn, the leading figure 
in the investigation which has to a considerable extent restructured 
South Africa's formal industrial relations system*) stated that 
politics were an essential part of trade union activity. He gave 
the view that the present official policy of suppressing the political 
activities of black unions was counter-productive for the free-market 
system in that it allowed the initiatives for political influence on 
black trade unions to be taken by agencies hostile to the present 
South African system. He pleaded for the potential political role 
of black trade unions to be recognised and "channelled in the right 
direction."^)
Professor Wiehahn's argument will be mentioned again in due 
course, but at this stage it is perhaps necessary to consider the 
basic assumption made by him; namely that politics are an essential 
function of trade unions.
1. DO TRADE UNIONS HAVE AN UNAVOIDABLE OR ESSENTIAL POLITICAL ROLE?
(By political role is meant any activity, action or policy 
directed at issues Outside the workplace itself.)
1.1 The General Political Role.
In a general sense yes. Any institution in society which 
articulates the interests or concerns of large aggregates of 
people has a political role, whether it is formally part of 
its set of objectives or not. Just as the church, established 
welfare organisations, large sporting bodies and professional 
associations have political roles, so do trade union move­
ments and employer bodies. It is necessary to detail these 
roles in order to discuss the political functions of trade 
unions-in South Africa intelligently. All major institutions 
in society, including trade unions function "politically" in 
the following ways:
1. Frofessor Wiehahn was Chairman of the Commission o f  Enquiry in to  
Labour L eg is la tio n } Report R.P. 47/1979. Government Printer, Pretoria.
2. Interview in "Sake-Rapport" (Business Rapport) Rapport, March 14, 1982.
I- the political support function:
they can influence support for or opposition to particular 
political parties. In Britain, the trade unions have 
traditionally supported the Labour Party. In Europe, 
just as the organised established churches encourage 
support for the Christian Democrat parties, so do most 
trade unions encourage support for Social Democrats or 
Socialists;
- creating loyalty and legitimacy:
even where they do not overtly support a government, major 
institutions like trade unions can help maintain the legi­
timacy of the state. Where they agree to the basic rules 
of societal behaviour laid down by the state (but without 
necessarily agreeing with particular policies) major 
institutions give implicit support to the system. Among 
their members they help to create or recreate respect for 
the rules of the system by their leaders being seen to 
operate within these rules. Where the state recognises 
the status and standing of the leaders of the trade union 
organisations and vice-versa, rank-and-file members will 
see an underlying unity (once again despite policy 
differences). In these ways trade unions or any major 
institutions, through the respect which their organisations 
conmand both from the state and from members, establish a 
chain of identification which helps maintain a wider and 
basic loyalty to the system. This loyalty to the system 
among working-class Britons, for example, is strengthened 
when Labour leaders become peers. A state can appeal for 
loyalty directly, but frequently it appeals for loyalty 
more effectively through major institutions, to their 
memberships.
This function is powerful but subtle, and is almost always 
overlooked by businessmen who tend to assess the effects 
of trade unions almost entirely in terms of public rhetoric
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and industrial strategies;
- the lobby and influence-group function:
trade unions, like any other organised group, will lobby 
or put pressure on the government and the bureaucracy to 
achieve ends beneficial to their members. It most 
societies this lobbying process, although informal, is as 
essential to citizen influence on government as the fran­
chise. This is particularly true because it is ongoing 
and not limited to elections once every few years. Normally, 
however, lobbying is more-or-less limited to the official 
sphere of interest of the organisation. With trade unions, 
the definition of the sphere of interest can vary tre­
mendously between trade unions and government and from 
country to country. In the Western world it is accepted 
that the sphere of interest of trade unions includes not 
only wages, working conditions and industrial/commercial 
legislation but also the general welfare policies of the 
government. Hence trade unions are actually or potentially 
important lobbies across a wide range of socio-economic 
and socio-political issues.
More Specific Political Roles - Within the System.
Trade unions have displayed a capacity to act in more specific 
ways in politics. Whereas the general political role referred 
to above is more-or-less inevitable, a specific political 
function is not. The degree to which trade unions develop 
specific political goals and strategies depends on a variety 
of factors in a society. Before considering these we must 
look at the specific ways in which they can act;
- the blocking or veto function;
by mounting demonstration strikes trade unions, acting 
together, can impede, block or veto collective employer 
action or legislation.
In South Africa, the general strike of 1922 was a massive 
and violent attempt to veto the decision by the Chamber of 
Mines to allow the replacement of white miners by blacks 
(this event belongs in our following category as well, 
however). Despite the virtual civil war it caused, it was 
not a revolutionary event - it was a violent exercise in 
protecting and reinforcing white labour interests. Despite 
the initial suppression of the militant protest by the 
authorities, the event mobilised white support for the cause 
of the white workers and the government was defeated in the 
subsequent elections.^
We have just seen a much smaller illustration of this in 
the "pensions strikes" in South Africa, in which a rela­
tively weak black union movement has actually caused the 
state to withdraw its proposals for compulsory preservation 
of pensions (providing for pension fund contributions to 
be continuous up to the age of retirement without the right 
to withdraw benefits). There was more to these strikes as 
well, but a veto-action was one aspect.
From the point of view of the present regime this issue 
was certainly not very salient and not too much should be 
made of the climb-down on the part of government. It 
illustrates the point, however;
- the demonstration campaign:
unions can identify an issue of critical interest to their 
members at a particular point and demonstrate for some 
policy change or reform. The issues could, theoretically,
1) Jill Nattrass, The South A frican  Economy: I t s  Growth and Change,
Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 73-77. Nattrass points
to the very significant wider effects of the 1922 rebellion in that 
the labour force was effectively split between whites and blacks with 
the whites securing a privileged status aligned with capital and in 
conflict with black labour interests. The event also had a deeply 
conditioning effect on white politics up to the present time.
cover almost anything affecting the interests of union 
members - subsidisation of transport, any one of a range 
of welfare benefits, national review of minimum wages, 
housing policy, etc.;
political articulation and mobilisation:
trade unions, still operating within the ground rules.of 
the system, can "sponsor" a political organisation or party 
which will operate within the "appropriate" political 
sphere to campaign for the interests of the class of people 
to which the trade union membership belongs. South Africa 
had a white Labour Party, sponsored by the white unions, in 
a coalition government in. 1924 onwards. At the present 
Stage in South Africa, the black union movement could not 
sponsor a political formation to operate at the parliamen­
tary level. Legislation (the Prohibition of Improper 
Political Interference Act, inter alia) as well as the 
political and social structure of .our society cuts the 
black union movement off from established political decision­
making. The "appropriate" sphere in the case of black 
unions would perhaps be deemed to be the "Community Council" 
level. It is conceivable that a political formation could 
campaign in a limited way for black-worker interests at the 
local authority level in black residential areas, but at 
this stage the lack of real powers by the Community Councils 
and their restricted formal scope robs them of any great 
value as a channel for the expression of black labour 
interests.
In a less structured way, labour leaders can plead the cause 
of their members from a variety of platforms of a semi- 
political or informal political kind. In this role they 
are operating essentially in a generalised way and this kind 
of activity is similar to the lobby function referred to 
under 1.2.
.3 Political Functions against the System.
All the roles mentioned above are reformist rather than 
radical in their effects. These types of activities are not 
geared to a transformation of political and economic struc­
tures. Even in some European countries like France, Italy 
and Britain, where the trade union sponsored parties are 
committed to the nationalisation of certain industries, the 
basic economic system is a mixed one which can accommodate 
both state and privately-owned industry, operating within the 
limits of a wide range of state controls on and interventions 
in the productive process. The goals and effects of this 
labour influence are not revolutionary or radical in a strict 
sense. This is despite the fact that many of the labour 
leaders mount a radical-sounding rhetoric. The tensions 
between the "left" and the "centre-right" in the British 
Labour Party, for example, show that the radical or revolu­
tionary working class formations are considerably contained 
or restrained within the union-sponsored political formations.
These countries, and others like Netherlands, Sweden, etc., 
also have radical or revolutionary parties, supported by some 
but not all trade unions. This is particularly marked in 
Italy and France. Although the European communist parties 
are not completely at one on goals and strategy, their formal 
and informal intention is to transform the structures of their 
societies to bring about collective control in all spheres of 
the society. The trade unions which support this progransne 
obviously can be said to be basically antagonistic to the 
prevailing systems. Here we should bear in mind, however, 
that even these trade unions, in their day-to-day functioning 
within the sphere of industrial relations, operate according 
to the rules of the system. They have a dual strategy, one 
short-term and one longer-term.
It is the longer-term goals of a trade union movement which 
are most feared by the state and by employers in South Africa.
It is necessary to examine the situation in South Africa 
within this context. Before doing so, however, some general 
relationships between labour-organisation and civil strife 
must be examined in a comparative, international perspective.
2. TRADE UNIONS AND RADICAL DISSIDENCE.
Having stated that organised labour can have a role in direct, 
radical confrontation with the state, it must be added immediately 
that this is by no means typical in the international setting. As 
Lever has once again reminded us recently, trade unions are generally 
a stabilising social force.^ Here a fundamental distinction 
between labour disputes and political destabilisation must be made. 
The focus in this analysis is on the political issue. As part of 
a massive comparative analysis of political violence all oyer the 
world, Gurr concludes that "Labour Unions are regime-oriented in 
most nations, and their size relative to the non-agricultural labour 
force tends to vary inversely with levels of civil strife."2) 
Furthermore, Gurr quotes convincing evidence produced by Komhauser 
and Mayer, Neal and Seeman, Templeton and Aberbach to suggest that 
membership in mediating organisations like trade unions tends, if 
anything, diminishes workers1 feelings of alienation and powerless­
ness, and hence their disposition to aggressive and confrontationst 31political responses.' Kerr and Ross and Hartmann in comparative 
surveys of patterns of industrial conflict in a wide variety of 
societies showed that labour protest of a confrontationst kind 
tends to peak fairly early in the process of industrialisation and 
to decline thereafter, as labour action becomes more and more a 
demonstration of protest rather than an attempt to disrupt the 
industrial system. This change has commonly been associated with 
the opening-up of channels through which workers feel they can 
obtain redress.4  ^ The institutionalisation of conflict through
1) G. Lever, "Trade Unions as a Social Force in South Africa",
In d u s tr ia l R ela tio n s Journal o f  South A fr ica , Vol. 1, No. 4, 1981,
pp. 36-39.
2) Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men R ebel, Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton 
University Press, 1971, p. 284.
3) I b id , pp.. 298-299.
4) I b id , pp. 314-315.
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recognition of labour organisations as part of the mediating 
system is accepted as having defused the political potential of 
worker grievances in most societies.
There are other reasons why trade unions are not generally found 
in the forefront of radical poiitical opposition as such. As 
trade unionists become involved in formal procedures, and drawn 
into the day-to-day process of industrial relations and union 
management, the more they are inclined to lose a great deal of 
former emphasis on radical goals which they might have had. The 
early analysis by Michels of this tendency toward technical 
specialisation and bureaucratic procedures among erstwhile socialist 
activists is universally accepted today.^ Revolutionary fervour 
becomes dissipated by the growing concern with organisational 
success or survival.
Furthermore, trade unions are highly visible organisations operating 
in a field of acknowledged conflict. In any society which represses 
dissidence, trade unions would be one of the first places the state 
would seek out dissidents. Trade unions, therefore, are more 
vulnerable than looser or diffuse movements like, say, activist 
religious sects Or widespread community-based political movements. 
Dissident trade unionists are often the first to be eliminated in 
political clampdowns, and hence the leadership has to be cautious 
and low-keyed in its political activities.
This is particularly significant since the successful mobilisation 
of mass movements in confrontation with existing state systems 
usually requires the inculcation of a sense of an "alternative" to 
the established order. Michael Mann sees the failure of the working 
classes to be led to a collective grasp of an a lte r n a tiv e  s o c ie ty , - 
the final stage in the development of class consciousness - as the 
most characteristic factor in the defeat of the revolutionary strategy.2^
1) Robert Michels, P o l i t i c a l  P a r tie s, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1915, pp. 185-188 and elsewhere.
2) Michael Mann, Consciousness and. A ction  among th e  Western Working 
C lass, London: MacMillan, 1973, pp. 13, 68-73.
Gurr and most other analysts of civil rebellion concur that the 
mobilisation of guiding ideas is necessary. Trade unions, as 
visible organisations which are generally not formally sanctioned 
to operate in the political domain are in greater difficulty in 
articulating a revolutionary or dissident consciousness than more 
diffuse and more elusive movements like radical religious factions 
or sects, comnunity movements or nationalistically-oriented parties. 
Mobilising political rhetoric stands out like a sore thumb, as it 
were, in the context of trade unions.
We can add to this the fact that trade unions in deeply class- 
divided societies operate among that section of the populace which 
is least confident of its ability to achieve planned ends, and 
also most likely to have its political vision qualified or confused 
by low-level economic concerns or security anxieties.^ Hence 
trade unions, if they acquire dissident political goals, have to 
attempt to sustain those goals in the social groups which are 
generally least receptive to the ideological commitments and sac­
rifices required. They frequently have to operate without the 
active involvement of dissident middle-class groupings which almost 
everywhere are most easily radicalised. Given this, the attempts 
of trade unions to whip up a sustained, programmatic dissident 
consciousness are likely to have to be so obvious as to be stra­
tegically suicidal. The argument here is simply that trade unions 
are far from being the ideal political vehicle for sustained action.
These are the broad conclusions which analysts have reached after 
extensive examinations of the history of labour movements and 
civic disorder throughout the world. They must be qualified some­
what, however.
The recent Polish experience is perhaps the most immediate example 
of a basis for qualification. The labour movement "Solidarity" 
has sustained a political onslaught on the state. One must
1) Ib id . (Large sections of the entire book are devoted to the 
analysis of factors like these in undermining the revolutionary 
potential of labouring classes.)
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recognise Immediately, however, that the mass of the Polish people, 
given their history, did not need a trade union movement to poli­
ticise them. Furthermore, steadily worsening management of the 
economy by the state and a tightening squeeze on the mass of con­
sumers appears to have produced a pervasive anger and survival 
anguish which in order to erupt possibly needed no more than the 
channel of expression which Solidarity provided. If no other 
organisations are available, labour movements will most certainly 
provide a nucleus of structure around which dissidence will grow.
Gurr notes this qualification himself when he points out that 
trade union membership in South America, for example - an area 
where discontent is intense and widespread - correlates mildly 
with civil unrest.^ More broadly, Gurr argues on the basis of 
a wide range of comparative evidence that where the intensity of 
discontent in organisations' membership remains high, all con­
stituency-based organisations will tend towards what he calls an 
"expressive function." This function can be contrasted with the 
more usual "instrumental functions" of providing greater welfare 
opportunities and opportunities for participation in aspects of 
decision-making. The "expressive function" is essentially one of 
providing an outlet for politically-oriented protest and under 
certain conditions, organisations functioning in this wey will 
certainly serve as a base for political action.
This is illustrated by the behaviour of some unions in the United 
States between the 1870's and 1930's. When federally regulated 
recognition to organise and bargain was granted to unions, the
2incidence of violent labour conflict declined to a negligible level.
In broad terms, the point being made here is that trade unions 
offer society an opportunity for institutionalising conflict by 
drawing them into established and regulated processes of negotia­
tion and bargaining. Granted this opportunity, the political
1) Gurr, a p .c i t . p. 284.
2) I b id t pp. 310-315.
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threat posed by moblised labour quickly declines, because unions 
by their very nature are far from being ideal vehicles for poli­
tical mobilisation as such. Where this opportunity is not or 
cannot be taken, labour organisations, along with a variety of 
others, will seek to change the rules of the system. The balance 
of evidence, however, indicates that the relatively peaceful, 
institutionalised process of industrial negotiation is more likely 
to occur than the second scenario.
Much hinges on the capacity of the state to “incorporate" labour 
movements into the institutionalised negotiation process. Ob­
viously, for this incorporation to occur, there has to be some 
trade-off. The labour movements have to be able to secure 
incremental benefits for their memberships. This is possible in 
a growing, buoyant economy under any economic system, whether 
free-market or socialist. Where the structural constraints in 
the economy, being either low capacity for growth in production 
or limitations on capacity to generate increasing employment (or 
both) are such as to offer little opportunity for trade unions to 
reap benefits from negotiation, attempts to institutionalise con­
flict will probably fail, unless the whole system is tightly 
regulated by an authoritarian regime with full control over unions 
and management (i.e. as in some Eastern Bloc societies).
In a growing economy, the incorporation of even very militant and 
aggressive unions can be highly beneficial in the long run by 
forcing management to attain greater efficiency and profitability. 
The case of the formerly militant American unions is often taken 
to illustrate the "functions of conflict" proposed above.^ 
Stagnant economies, however, cut off many opportunities for the 
accommodation of class conflict and leave the society vulnerable 
to many different forms of destabilisation.
1) Lewis, A. Coser, The Functions o f  S o c ia l C o n flic t, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1956.
*3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LABOUR UNREST AND POLITICAL UNREST AMONG 
THE WORKING C L A S S . _________________________
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Many analysts draw attention to the essential difference between 
labour unrest as such and political unrest among the membership 
of unions. Strikes and labour unrest can be and should be analysed 
within a different framework than that suggested in the previous 
section, unless there are clear indications of a political dynamic 
in the behaviour of the workers themselves.
In parethesis, we should note the emphasis on the workers them­
selves. Many studies have shown that the ideology of union 
leadership, as opposed to membership, is frequently unrelated to 
the type of trade union action they advocate. In European 
countries, different union federations from far left to centre 
in terms of rhetoric and ideology behave in much the same way in 
the marketplace. If the labour movement is effectively part of 
the institutional process, the union leadership is powerfully 
constrained.^ One cannot necessarily judge the political poten­
tialities of a trade union movement from the political character 
of its leadership or spokesmen.
Generally speaking strikes are not effective political weapons, 
unless they become disengaged from specific industrial settings 
and take on a generalised form, I.e. as in Poland recently. An 
individual strike, if politically-motivated, leaves the union, 
which may be responsible in such a highly vulnerable position, 
even in Western democracies, that it would be bound to weaken 
itself beyond repair. If a union movement uses a strike as a 
political weapon it can only be comforting to the state, providing 
a convenient opportunity to isolate the dissident organisation.
Numbers of well-researched studies show that strike-proneness in 
industry cannot be understood politically, but relates to a different 
set of factors, usually found in the characteristics of the labour
1) See, for example, discussion in Mann, o p .a i t . pp. 37-38.
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force or of labour conditions. Strike-proneness, for example, is 
often associated with homogeneous, low-level labour forces that 
live in socially isolated conditions. Hence coal miners, steve­
dores, textile workers and lumber workers have been shown to 
exhibit the homogeneity and sense of cohesion to acquire a militant 
or at least "active" .labour consciousness but this consciousness 
does not automatically carry within it a political flavour or 
political implications.^ The homogeneous and socially segregated 
black labour forces of South Africa spring immediately to mind 
here.
Another major point which has to be taken account of is the fact 
that strikes more often than not show certain kinds of relationships 
with aspects of the structure of working conditions at the plant 
level. Strikes as phenomena are to be seen essentially as part of 
a broader set of phenomena like absenteeism* isolated minor acts of 
industrial sabotage (wrecking toilets or damaging machinery) ill­
ness rates, industrial accidents or poor productivity. Often, when 
one is absent the other occurs. Hyman illustrates this when he 
says "when firms (in the U.S.A.) i.. introduced severe penalties 
for unofficial strikers, workers turned from stoppages to go slows 
with considerable success ... a typical comment (from a tyre 
industry executive) was 'give me a good, clean wildcat any day'."^
Many of the labour problems in industry which appear to reflect 
hidden political agendas can be traced to features in the structure 
of employment, remuneration, control and authority in industry.
Even chronically bad communication, so often loosely ascribed to 
"cultural" differences, either between races or classes, is 
frequently a symptom of something wrong in the organisation of 
the production process. Then again, one must bear in mind that 
the short strike can become part of the everyday culture of inter­
action in the workplace, without it being accompanied by serious
1) See, for example, Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Inter­
industry propensity to strike" in A. Komhauser, e t . a l ., (eds.) I n d u s tr ia l C o n flic t, New York: McGraw Hill, 1954.
2) Richard Hyman, S tr ik e s t London: Fontana/Collins, 1972, p. 56.
(Chapter 3 in general illustrates the point being made.)
intentions to disrupt production or the economic system - very 
much like the tendency of some spouses to beat each other as part 
of a reasonably stable and secure albeit unhappy marriage.
It is not the task in this paper to expand on the causes of 
strikes, but simply to make the general point that all the research 
evidence, even from conservative American researchers like Kerr 
and Siegel, points to the fact that industrial unrest as such 
runs according to a different pattern of cause and effect than 
political unrest in the labour force. To run the two phenomena 
together is to confuse the issue and prevent a proper understanding 
of either.
This point notwithstanding, there are sometimes general factors 
which, although not essentially political in the narrow sense, 
create a climate of consciousness among employees which seem to 
predispose them to greater industrial militancy in each individual 
conflict situation. These factors have to be assessed carefully 
for each society, but examples can be given Of certain "extra­
industrial" factors that aggravate labour-management conflict.
The prominence of "dynastic and tradition-minded elites" in France 
is quoted as one example. Another is religions which disparage 
economic activity and lower the status of the entrepreneur. A 
recently urbanised labour force, not fully accepting of the norms 
of industrial society, can also be mentioned. The opportunities 
which societies allow for industrial workers to 'deflect1 their 
aspirations onto leisure and consumption behaviour must also be 
noted as a factor. In this regard the general point is that workers 
everywhere tend to lower their expectations in order to make an 
adaptation to the constraints of their situation. For this pro­
cess to occur most effectively, the workers should accept the broad 
values governing that situation. Extra-industrial factors like 
those mentioned above lower the acceptance of or trust in the 
system and can aggravate labour conflict.^ The relevance of these 
factors to the South African situation must not be overlooked.
1) See, for example, A.M. Ross and P.T. Hartman, Changing P attern s  
o f  In d u s tr ia l C o n flic t, New York: John Wiley, 1960, and Clark
Kerr, e t . a l . ,  In d u str ia lism  and I n d u s tr ia l Man, London: Heinemann,
1962.
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However, one must nevertheless not confuse these general extra­
industrial factors with more overtly political motivations.
4. INDICATIONS OF THE PATTERN IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Hopefully the relevance of the general analyses above to an under­
standing of the South African situation should have become apparent. 
For reasons outlined above, our pattern of segregation and social 
isolation of the black labour force, our "(Jynastic" white industrial 
elites, the absence of opportunities of blacks to participate in 
and have knowledge of the process of government and the recent 
urbanisation of the labour force are all factors which result in 
low trust relations in our industrial setting. We should not delude 
ourselves that we are likely to enjoy above average labour stability 
during the period of our development towards a more open society. 
Myriad factors are likely to provide 'extra-industrial' aggravation 
of labour relations.
In addition to the factors just mentioned,.we must also bear in 
mind that the limitations on life-style in our black townships, 
and more especially among our black migrant labour forces, prevent 
workers from deflecting their occupational or power aspirations into 
leisure behaviour or interests in consumer satisfactions. The 
importance of these factors in producing a stabilising conscious­
ness - often called a "false consciousness" - among workers throughout 
the world has been well-documented.^ Conditions of housing, 
transport, access to facilities and amenities and Influx Control 
laws do a considerable amount to prevent our black workers "trans­
lating" their industrial benefits into life-style rewards. Our 
personnel officers start off with a huge initial disadvantage in 
attempting to accommodate the human aspirations of our black labour 
forces.
1) See footnote 1) on page 14 of this document and also Mann, o p .a i t .
Another factor which should be emphasised is remoteness from 
government and administration. Our black employees have no 
basis on which to begin to have faith in the large, abstract 
systems which run all our lives. Why should they “trust" pension 
fund administrations, for example, when they can hardly be ex­
pected to trust labour bureaux, housing administrations, educa­
tional systems and the like. Consider the following examples of 
the endemic problems affecting important aspects of the everyday 
life of blacks. There is a huge and persisting shortage of homes 
to rent and accommodation in the publicly-administered townships.
There have been public disputes about the reliability of water- 
accounts in many major townships. There are notable instances 
of leakages of examination questions in the black senior-certificate 
examinations. It is well known that a very low correlation exists 
between trial-matric results for black candidates and the results 
of the final official examinations. Recent difficulties concerning 
pension funds have perhaps illustrated this larger problem.
All these factors can obviously spill over to produce a politi­
cally motivated labour force within our industrial system. However, 
this must not be anticipated in a generalised, vague fashion, 
firstly because the political concerns may not be expressed in the 
workplace as such and secondly because the earlier analysis has shown th 
the emergence of recognised black trade unions may well act against 
political destabilisation in the labour force. Bear in mind that 
the comments made about the unsuitability and vulnerability of 
trade unions as political vehicles are particularly apposite to 
South Africa. A revolutionary trade unionist who acts upon his/ 
her convictions has a very slim chance of survival in our situation.
The Centre for Applied Social Sciences is presently making an 
evaluation of the recent "pensions strikes" in order to gain 'hard1 
data on the emerging dynamics of our industrial relations system.
At this stage very little empirical evidence is available, however, 
and what does exist is rather sketchy. Nevertheless, some very 
suggestive findings have emerged from a variety of research inputs.
These at least allow us to begin tentatively answering the question
r
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of how close or remote the possibilities of a "politicisation" 
of our industrial relations are.
Firstly, it is clear from various studies, but most especially 
from research conducted for the Buthelezi Commission,^ that the 
black urban industrial and migrant labour forces have high and 
rising levels of generalised socio-political discontent. The 
demonstration effect of the events in Zimbabwe and earlier events 
elsewhere have unleashed a perception of an alternative to the 
present political order. Today, some 80 percent of virtually all 
samples of blacks, rural and urban, display verbal signs of un­
happiness with the present order. Roughly 50 percent express 
these sentiments more intensely as "anger" or "impatience", and 
virtually all blacks openly discuss the possibilities of political 
violence or unrest. Mass strikes are seen as the most convenient 
specific strategy should no change in political circumstances 
occur in the next few years (60 percent or more people identify 
the mass strike as a political weapon and this is second only to 
the prediction of generalised violence).
This can be seen as emphatic verbal protest and not be a revolutionary 
consciousness. An analysis of the responses to specific items 
in the studies, however, suggests that some 20 to 30 percent of 
at black people have a consistently militant orientation and reveal
at least an emotional preparedness to act.
Furthermore, the research for the Buthelezi Commission shows that 
a dramatic change in the content of consciousness has taken place 
over the past 10 years. Whereas the dominant aspiration revealed 
in studies in the early 1970's was for reform and improvement, 
without comparisons with whites, today the dominant aspiration 
is for equality or opportunities for equality or for "social 
justice". The analysis by Gurr referred to earlier identifies 
these sentiments as. indicating “relative deprivation". Gurr 
argues convincingly that this type of consciousness is the most 
coiimon and potent accompaniment of political violence or revolu­
tionary behaviour.
1) B u th elezi Commission, Vol. VI. "The Report on the Attitude Surveys",
. Inkatha Institute, 1982.
These are typical findings relating to generalised political 
attitudes and sentiments. The same study for the Buthelezi 
Commission, as well as another major study undertaken by the 
German Bergstraesser Institute^ reveals, simultaneously, that 
the same highly discontented blacks do not translate their poli­
tical sentiments into a rejection of the capitalist, free-market 
system. From responses to a variety of questions, both direct 
and disguised, it is clear that the notion of factories owned by 
an elected black government or the discouragement of white, Indian 
or Coloured businessmen is supported by no more than roughly 15 
to 20 percent of the black population and by the same proportion 
in the industrial labour force.
The pattern of responses in these and other studies tends to 
suggest that at this stage the (white) industrial employer is 
viewed by the black workers as relatively benign, compared with 
other agencies in their socio-political world. In a current 
study,2) among black employees, roughly half of whom were dis­
contented or highly discontented in their work situation, roughly 
one-third see the employers as a source of security in a financial 
crisis. Preliminary results in regard to the "pensions strikes" 
indicate that the dominant focus of mistrust among the black workers 
tended to be directed at government rather than at employers. The 
impression, at this stage, is that the perceptions did not confuse 
or run the employers and government together. Similarly, a recent 
study by Ardington and Nattrass3) shows that, among the black 
unions covered in the sample, a careful distinction was made between 
the spheres of responsibility of the central government and those 
of employers in regard to the alleviation of workers' problems.
1) Theodor Hanf, e t . a l .  South A fr ica : The P rospects f o r  Peaceful
Change, London: Rex Collings, 1981.
2) Valerie Miller and Theiriba Nzimande, P ercep tion s o f  Aging,  P rovision s  
f o r  R etirem ent and Pensions among Black Workers in  th e  Durban Area, 
Durban: Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 1982. Document and
Memorandum Series.
3) Elisabeth Ardington and Jill Nattrass, A Survey o f  A tt i tu d e s  to  Labour R ela tio n s and Labour M o b ility  in  South A fr ica, Durban; 
Economic Research Unit, University of Natal, Durban, 1981.
There is no generalised confusion of the employers and the state 
as could occur in a highly radicalised state of political con­
sciousness. Other results in the research for the Buthelezi 
Commission show that the presence of white employers in the 
political world of blacks is in fact welcomed by them. The ex­
pertise and the employment opportunities brought into the system 
by the white entrepreneurial class is positively valued. For 
example, political dispensations which favour the removal of 
whites from the polity or the economy are vehemently rejected.
A project undertaken specifically for the Buthelezi Commission, 
in which a small cross-section of black trade union organisers, 
shop stewards and prominent rank-and-file members were interviewed 
personally, revealed a pattern which is fairly typical of studies 
in Europe.1  ^ Whereas a slight majority of organisers who cared 
to respond saw the achievement of political change as a primary 
goal of unionism, only minorities of shop stewards (one-third) and 
smaller minorities of prominent rank-and-file members (one-sixth) 
saw their unions as having political objectives as primary goals. 
Despite this, a substantial minority of rank-and-file members saw 
it as being necessary for unions to co-operate with political 
organisations (like the A..N.C. and Inkatha) but here again they 
did not run the two types of organisations together in a mono­
lithic political strategy.
This is not to say that rank-and-file members interviewed, as well 
as the shop stewards did not display an acute consciousness of the 
essential conflict between management and workers. They also 
displayed a militant political consciousness. The researcher,
Glass, in fact concludes that it is impossible ... "for blacks to 
separate economic and political questions ... the unions cannot 
resolve the workers' problems only in the factories. The unions 
somehow or another must find a way of resolving the non-economic 
questions as well."2) However, one must remember that, simultaneously,
1) Humphrey Glass, Research R eport on Trade Unions, Memorandum submitted 
to the Buthelezi Commission, 6.7.1981, Commission Archive, Inkatha 
Institute, Durban.
2) I b id , p. 14.
no more than one-third and one-sixth of the shop stewards and 
rank-and-file members respectively perceived the union as such 
as having a primary political role in the production situation 
itself at the present time. .
The political goals openly being espoused by some black trade 
union movements - FOSATU for example^) - must be assessed in the 
light of the context described above. It is not within the power 
of trade union organisations to carry politics as such into the 
workplace at the present time, given the constraints in the situa­
tion and those imposed by the workers themselves.
5. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS.
This analysis has shown that, in the international setting, there 
are a number of factors which limit the tendency for and capacity 
of trade unions to successfully mount political strategies aimed 
at altering the basic rules of a political or economic system. 
Where they operate politically they do so within an established 
framework of rules and conventions. This is not to be confused 
with the intensity of labour unrest or frequency of strikes, 
which may vary according to the effect of a different set of 
factors; factors within the industrial setting.
One may summarise the political constraints and limitations on 
unions as follows:
- even militant trade unions appear to become relatively easily 
formalised or bureaucratised and tend, despite the flavour 
of their rhetoric and perhaps even their militancy vis-a-vis 
shop floor issues, to become part of a stable system of regu­
lated conflict;
- even where trade union operations and structures do not 
accommodate the system, industrial workers in many or most 
countries impose constraints on political actiyity themselves.
1) See Tony Weaver, "Fosatu stands committed to Socialist Struggle", 
Sunday Times, 18 April 1982, p. 29.
2 1 .
The general pattern in most capitalist economies is for worker- 
consciousness either to adapt to the limitations of class 
roles, or to stop short of developing revolutionary aims.
Workers tend to accept the basic values and rules of the 
established system and their consciousness is aimed at maxi­
mising their benefits within that system;
- trade unions are inappropriate organisations for the pursuit 
of radical aims, due to high visibility, vulnerability and 
to a role-commitment to the technicalities of bargaining in 
the production process. They have to change their essential 
nature in order to become political mobilisation organisations, 
and such changes are signalled long in advance, and are easily 
identified and controlled in any society with strict security 
control;
- This is not to say that "radical" union leaders or even cam­
paigns conducted within a union movement will not aim to take 
advantage of worker grievances in order to aggravate conflict 
or destabilise industry. This has happened in many countries. 
However, the fact is that such aims are usually pursued within 
a framework of grievance bargaining or industrial conflict for 
reasons already stated. The action does not tend to become 
political as such. Hence, the adequacy of structures of 
industrial relations in industry tend to impose limits on the 
effect of this kind of political motivation. The less dissatis­
fied workers are the less the effect of attempts to destabilise 
will be.
The South African situation differs from the typical "international"
picture given above, in the following ways:
- black workers are drawn from black communities which have, 
particularly over the past few years, acquired a consciousness 
of an alternative political system. Our workers are politically 
much more radical than, say, European workers;
- black trade unions, while "incorporated" into the industrial 
relations system, are prevented by other aspects of policy from
Tparticipating in the "normal" political activities of most 
organised groups, etc.;
- hence a type of political activity which is essentially 
supportive of the democratic process is cut off from the unions 
in South Africa;
- therefore the incorporation of black trade unions is essentially 
"partial" in the South African setting, and hence less likely
to secure the basic "regime orientation" of unions in most 
industrial countries;
- black workers may obtain redress for industrial grievances in 
the labour relations system but cannot achieve similar redress 
as regards their community conditions, nor can they "translate" 
their work benefits into adequate community and life-style 
rewards.
These factors create a, situation of imbalance in which, as the 
research quoted has shown, black workers and trade unionists see 
very clearly that the shop-floor negotiation alone cannot be as 
rewarding for their overall interests as would be the case in a 
different kind of political system. Hence as Lever1) has observed, 
there is and will be an increasing pressure on unions from workers 
to expand their scope to encompass community issues and political 
issues. The situation is one of great structural contradiction 
which, theoretically, could sacrifice chances of Our society 
reaping the benefits of an institutionalised industrial relations 
system.
These factors notwithstanding, our policy-makers still have time 
to attempt to resolve the contradictions. Black rural and urban 
employee groups have not yet generalised their rejection of the 
system of production and nor do they reject the role of the white- 
owned industrial establishment. There is at this stage still a 
remarkably balanced awareness of the benefits of industrial growth 
and technological expertise. Despite mounting political anger, 
a basic differentiation between the private employer and the state 
or state-controlled system is made. The fact that so few direct
22.
1) Lever, o p .o i t . conclusions.
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expressions of political grievance have been drawn into industrial 
bargaining is due in no small measure to this 'differentiated 
consciousness.1
Professor Wiehahn, in the reference given in the introduction to 
this paper, perceives the need for an expansion of political 
opportunity to protect the domain integrity of our industrial 
relations system. This analysis bears him out, and emphasises 
that our present relative industrial stability is due perhaps to 
a remarkably refined but perhaps tenuous distinction made by 
rank-and-file black employees. Industry's welfare depends ori this 
distinction not becoming blurred. Therefore, it is essentially 
in industry's own interests to plead for reforms outside of the 
industrial sphere which will prevent the political process 
usurping the labour relations system. Businessmen themselves 
must attempt to assist black workers in finding alternatives for 
political expression which do not have to involve the trade unions 
or industrial relations generally.
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